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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MELANY ZOUMADAKIS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
V . 
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL 
CENTER, Et al., 
Defendants/Appellees. 
APPELLANT BRIEF 
App. Case No. 2004054 
APPELLANT BRIEF 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to § 78-2a-3 et. seq. of the Utah Code Annotated, 
in that this is a case that was transfeired from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court 
of Appeals. This matter is an appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court final order 
wherein the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) of the Utah 
Code Annotated. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
The District Court erred by granting appellees' Motion to Dismiss and by not 
allowing appellant to conduct discovery that would support the allegations in the 
Complaint. The Complaint was sufficiently plead according to Rule 8 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure and the District Court erred by dismissing appellant's claims. The 
District Court also erred when it ignored appellant's request for time to amend the 
complaint during oral arguments and issued its final order to dismiss before appellant 
could file her Motion to Amend. 
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These issues have been reserved for appeal because a final ruling against 
Appellant took effect on May 24,2004, and a timely appeal was filed on June 22,2004. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for challenging the District Court's findings are reviewed 
"for correctness, according them [the District Court] no particular deference." Bonham v. 
Morgan. 788 P.2d 497,499 (Utah 1989). In reviewing the District Court's grant of a 
motion to dismiss for correctness, the Court "must accept the factual allegations in the 
complaint as true and consider all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts in a 
light most favorable to the plaintiff." Ho v. Jim's Enterprises. Inc.. 29 P.3d 633,636 
(Utah 2001). 
The standard of review for the "denial to amend pleadings is abuse of discretion." 
Kasco Services Corporation v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86,92 (Utah 1992). The "primary 
consideration that a trial judge must take into account in determining whether leave 
should be granted is whether the opposing side would be put to unavoidable prejudice by 
having an issue adjudicated for which he had not had time to prepare." Id. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
"A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief... shall contain (1) a short plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for 
judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled/' 
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
".. .a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of 
the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." 
Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution: 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law.95 
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Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution: 
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law..." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 5, 2003, appellant filed a Verified Complaint claiming defamation, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with contract. On 
January 23,2004, appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support 
thereof, stating that appellant had failed to state a claim. Appellant replied with an 
Objection to the Motion to Dismiss and appellees filed a reply memorandum. Oral 
arguments were held on May 10, 2004. Appellant argued that discovery would be an 
integral part of the case and that an allowance of time to amend the complaint would be 
in order before dismissing the claims. 
On May 24,2004, the court filed an Order granting appellees Motion to Dismiss. 
The Court found that the claim for defamation was not pled with particularity and that 
qualified privilege prevented the claim. On the issue of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, the court found that the claim was insufficient and that the alleged 
conduct did not rise to the level required by Utah law. Finally the court found with 
respect to the claim of interference with an employment contract, that there was no 
contract to be enforced. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about June 11,1990, the appellant began her employment as a registered 
nurse with appellee, Uintah Basin Medical Center (hereinafter "UBMC"). (Compl. f 5). 
As far as appellant knew, she never received a negative report during her employment 
with UBMC Home Healthcare. (Compl. f 6). 
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On or about September 19,2003, the appellant was called into appellee, Lloyd 
Nielson's (hereinafter "Nielson"), office and was told that there have been numerous 
complaints by appellee, Dr. Marie Mason (hereinafter "Mason"), against appellant. 
(CompL f 7). The specific complaints by Mason included that the appellant was telling 
patients that Mason was ordering wrong tilings, that Mason was giving improper care, 
and that appellant smelled of alcohol as complained of by an unsolicited patient. (CompL 
f 8). According to appellant's received information and belief, appellee, Carolyn Smith 
(hereinafter "Smith"), misrepresented to Mason that appellant was questioning his care. 
(CompL f9). 
Without any research into these allegations, Nielson wrote a disciplinary action 
subjecting appellant to alcohol and drug screens, a communications class, denial of 
appellant to speak with Mason's patients, and denial of appellant to speak with any 
patient or doctor about various treatments. (CompL f 10). These restrictions on appellant 
would make it impossible for her to follow her general duties as a registered nurse-
(CompL f l l ) . 
During this meeting with Nielson, appellant was asked to sign a disciplinary 
action form . Appellant would not sign the disciplinary action form, and requested to take 
it home, review it, and make proper suggestions with her attorney. When appellant would 
not sign the form Nielson fired her. Due to this firing, appellant lost her long term sick 
leave, medical benefits, life insurance, retirement benefits, wages, and her job. (CompL f 
14.) 
Appellant claims that Nielson defamed her by adding untrue reports to her 
employment file, told the Department of Workforce Services that she quit and was not 
fired, and misstated that appellant's professionalism and work history which affected her 
ability to keep her job, or to obtain future work. (CompL f 36). 
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According to appellant's information and belief, the disciplinary action came as a 
result of libel, slanderous, patently false, and fraudulent misrepresentations by appellees 
Nielson, Mason, Smith, and/or other John Does. (Compl. f 12). According to appellant, 
she believes that appellees did nothing to confirm or corroborate the allegations against 
the appellant. (Compl. f 13). 
Appellant filed her complaint against appellees on December 5,2003. Appellees 
then filed its Motion to Dismiss on February 18,2004. Appellant replied in an Objection 
to the Motion to Dismiss on February 24,2004 and then filed a request for oral argument. 
(Docketing Statement f S). At the oral argument appellant repeatedly stated that 
dismissal without discovery would be unfair. (Tr. at 11,12,13,20,21). As well, 
appellant asked the court for the time allowed to amend the complaint before considering 
dismissal. (Tr. at 18). The District Court filed its Order granting appellees' Motion to 
Dismiss. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant's claims of defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
tortious interference with employment contract were all sufficiently plead in her Verified 
Complaint. The District Court erred when the granted appellees Motion to Dismiss. This 
case was dismissed without allowing appellant to participate in any discovery or amend 
the complaint. Appellant requests that this Order by the District Court should be 
remanded so appellant can conduct necessary discovery regarding her case because the 
Complaint contained sufficient statements of claims. As well, appellant requests that this 
case be remanded so that appellant can have time to submit a Motion to Amend the 
Complaint to plead her claims with more particularity. 
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ARGUMENT 
L THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY DISMISSING THE CASE 
BECAUSE APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT WAS PLEAD WITH 
PARTICULARITY TO SURVIVE A MOTION TO DISMISS. 
The District Court erred by granting the Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a 
claim because appellant's complaint was sufficient to allow this case to continue into 
discovery. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "restrict the pleadings to the task of 
general notioe-giving and invest the deposition-discovery process with the vital role in the 
preparation for trial." Williams vt State Farm Insurance Company, 656 P.2d 966,970 
(Utah 1982), citing Blackfaam v, Saelgrove, 280 PJ2d453,455 (Utah 1955). The 
Williams Court goes on to state that "a complaint is required only to ... give the opposing 
parly fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication 
of the type of litigation involved." Id. Appellant did file a complaint that was sufficient 
to give notice of the claims and an indication of the type of litigation involved. The 
following arguments will outline the claims in the complaint and why they should have 
withstood the Motion to Dismiss. 
A. APPELLANT HAD A VIABLE CAUSE OF ACTION IN 
DEFAMATION AGAINST APPELLEES. 
In appellant's Complaint it states that appellees published falsehoods of appellant 
to other employees and to the Etepartment of WoddTorce Services. These falsehoods were 
clearly listed as "specific complaints by Mason included that the [appellant] was telling 
patients that Mason was ordering wrong things, that Mason was giving improper care, 
and that the [appellant] smelled of alcohol as complained of by an unsolicited patient." 
Compl. % 8. Due to these defamatory statements appellant has lost her job with UBMC, 
cannot find new employment, and is in danger of losing her home. 
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The District Court in its Order granting the Motion to Dismiss stated that 
appellant's claim for defamation was not plead with particularity and that the general 
statements referred to in the Complaint do not inform the defendants when, where, and 
whom the statements were made by. However, in Williams, the Court stated that "a 
complaint for defamation must set forth 'the language complained of... in words or 
words to that effect/" 656 R2d 966, 970 (Utah 1982). The Williams Court stated that 
statements such as "annoy, threaten, and intimidate" or "derogatory and libelous 
statements" are insufficient. Id. However, in the case at bar, appellant has plead in 
"words to that effect,9' the untrue statements of the appellees. The defamatory statements 
that appellant plead in her Complaint were plead with enough particularity to survive a 
Motion to Dismiss and to continue on to the discovery process. 
The District Court also found that the defamation claim could be dismissed 
because the statements were subject to qualified privilege. "If qualified privilege exists, 
the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the privilege was abused. The plaintiff can 
show abuse of the privilege by proving that the defendant acted with malice or that the 
publication of the defamatory material extended beyond those who had a legally justified 
reason for receiving it." Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991). Appellant 
would hope to prove with discovery, even though the defamatory statements made by 
Mason, Smith, and Nielson may be protected by qualified privilege, that possible 
statements made to Workforce Services would be publishing of the defamatory 
statements. Appellant argues that discovery is needed to obtain her employment file and 
her Department of Workforce Services file to substantiate how far the defamatory 
statements have been spread. However, even if Workforce Services would be considered 
a legitimately interested recipient or third-party and covered by qualified privilege, the 
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District Court could have allowed appellant time to file a Motion to Amend to include in 
her defamation claim that appellees acted with malice. Once the Complaint was amended 
with the facts showing appellees acted with malice, then the defamation claim would 
stand the challenge of qualified privilege. 
Therefore, the District Court should have denied the Motion to Dismiss and 
allowed appellant to either seek discovery of her employment file and her Department of 
Workforce Services file, or allow appellant time to file a Motion to Amend the Complaint 
to add facts to her defamation claim to show appellees acted with malice. 
B. APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL ©ISTRESS IS A VIABLE CAUSE OF ACTION 
AGAINST APPELLEES. 
Appellant has been suffering from severe emotion distress since hearing the 
defamatory statements by Mason, Smith, and Nielson. In order for a claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress to survive it must be "so extreme and outrageous as to 
permit recovery/' Walter v. Stewart 67 P3d 1042, 1048 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). The 
level of distress must "rise to a level that "no reasonable [person] could be expected to 
endure." Id- at 1049. The conduct of the tortfeasor should be "atrocious, and utterly 
intolerable in a civilized community." Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 
949,977-78 (Utah 1992). The Walter Court stated that these elements are "each 
questions of law for the court to detennine, in the first instance." 67 P3d 1042,1048. 
Appellant believes the District Court erred when it held that appellant's claim of 
intentional emotional distress was insufficient because it did "not rise to the level 
required by Utah law." The District Court also stated that case law "indicates mere 
termination is not sufficient to constitute outrageous conduct as required for a valid" 
claim. (Order, May 24,2004). 
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Appellant disagrees with the District Court because the defamatory comments in 
combination with her being fired caused appellant to suffer severe emotional distress. 
Appellant was told of complaints stating she was telling patients that Mason was ordering 
wrong things, that Mason was giving improper care, and that the appellant smelled of 
alcohol that was complained of by an unsolicited patient. After over 13 years of working 
with UBMC and having an exemplary work record, appellant was devastated with these 
complaints. In addition to these defamatory comments, which appellant maintains are 
completely false, appellant was forced to either sign a disciplinary action form or be 
terminated. Appellant disagreeing with the false statements recorded on the form, refused 
to sign the disciplinary action form, resulting in her termination. 
These events that occurred severely effected appellant. Appellant has been 
receiving counseling and is on medication due to the emotion distress she has suffered. 
In addition, appellant is horribly embarrassed from the statements made and is anxious 
and fearful of the bad reputation these comments have inflicted. Appellant's ability to 
find a job due to these defamatory comments has been hindered and this causes additional 
emotional distress. 
Appellant requests that the Court remand this claim back to the District Court so 
through the discovery process, appellant can further prove the defamatory statements and 
who they have been published to. These facts will come to light with the ability to 
discover appellant's employment file and her file with Workforce Services. Appellant 
further argues from the statements above that her intentional infliction of emotional 
distress claim does rise to the level of "atrocious and utterly intolerable conduct" because 
she was not merely terminated, she was defamed by her co-workers and subjected to a 
forced termination because she would not agree with the defamatory statements alleged. 
Therefore, appellant's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim should be 
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remanded back to the District Court because there were sufficient facts stated to support 
the claim and to survive a Motion to Dismiss. 
C APPELLANTS CLAIM FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WOULD NOT STAND AS A SUFFICIENT CAUSE 
OF ACTION, HOWEVER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY NOT 
ALLOWING APPELLANT TIME TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT. 
Appellant claimed tortious interference with employment contract in the 
Complaint. The Complaint truthfully stated that appellees all contributed to the 
defamatory statements made against appellant, which led to appellants termination from 
Jber employment and which has made it impossible for her to obtain comparable 
employment Appellant also argued that appellees had breached their procedure by not 
following the fonnal grievance procedure in the Employee Handbook. However, 
appellant now admits that no contract of employment existed between her and UBMC, 
due to that it was considered employment at-will and was so stated in the Employee 
Handbook and Employee Acknowledgement form. 
In now admitting that appellant had made a mistake in the claim asserted, 
appellant feels that because it was requested in the Oral Argument that appellant should 
have been allowed time to amend the Complaint before a Motion to Dismiss would be 
considered. Appellant requests this Court to remand this case back to the District Court 
to allow appellant time to file a Motion to Amend her Complaint. 
If appellant is allowed time to amend her Complaint, appellant would be able to 
amend the claim of tortious interference with employment contract, to the correct claim 
of wrongful discharge. Along with this amended claim appellant would state supporting 
facts that show appellees wanted appellant terminated because appellant keep meticulous 
records and had a zealous desire to follow all state laws and regulations regarding the 
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treatment of patients. Appellant would show in an amended complaint and through 
discovery that appellees wanted appellant terminated so they could contravene 
enforceable professional ethical obligations. 
Therefore, based on the above arguments appellant requests that this Court 
remand this case back to the District Court to allow appellant time to amend this claim in 
the Complaint. The arguments below will also show support for appellant's request to 
amend the Complaint. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY NOT ALLOWING 
APPELLANT TIME TO FILE A MOTION TO AMEND 
COMPLAINT BEFORE CONSIDERING A MOTION TO DISMISS. 
The District Court erred when it ignored appellant's request during oral arguments 
for time to amend the Complaint. Appellant clearly states on the record that "a Motion to 
Dismiss would be improper at this time and allowance for an amended complaint would 
be in order." (Tr. at 18). In granting the Motion to Dismiss, the District Court did not 
allow any time for appellant to file a Motion to Amend the Complaint. 
"The standard of review of a denial to amend pleadings is abuse of discretion." 
Kasco Services Corporation. 831 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah 1992), citing Cheney v. Rucker. 381 
P.2d 86,91 (Utah 1963). Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, "a party 
may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; 
and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." (2004). When a trial judge is 
determining whether a leave should be granted, the judge must consider "whether the 
opposing side would be put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue adjudicated for 
which he had not had time to prepare." Kasco Services Corporation, 831 P.2d 86,92 
(Utah 1992), citing Bekks Bar V Ranch v, Huth, 664 P.2d 455,464 (Utah 1983). 
In the case at bar, the District Court did not allow appellant the time necessary to 
file a Motion to Amend before dismissing the case. Rule 15(a) states that a leave to 
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amend should be "fteely given when justice so requires." It would have been more just to 
grant appellant time to file a Motion to Amend than to take the chosen course of action in 
dismissing the case with prejudice. Appellant requests this Court to remand this case 
back to the District Court, so that appellant can file a Motion to Amend the Complaint. 
If remanded back to the District Court, appellant would be able to properly file a 
Motion to Amend accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities in support, 
and a proposed amended complaint See Holmes Development LLC v. Cook, 48 P3d 
895,909-10 (Utah 2002). When a court is determining whether to grant or deny a motion 
to amend, "Utah courts have focused on three factors: the timeliness of the motion; the 
justification given by the movant for the delay; and the resulting prejudice to the 
responding party." Kelly v, Hard Money Funding, Inc», 87 P3d 734,742 (Utah Ct App. 
2004). 
If appellant was given the time to file a Motion to Amend it would have been 
considered timely because the case had not reached the advanced stages of the litigation 
process. At the point of dismissal, appellees had not filed an Answer, therefore, an 
amended complaint would not have prejudiced the appellees because they would have 
ample time to prepare for any amended issues. Appellant's following arguments will 
support the request that this Court remand this case back to the District Court to allow 
appellant to file a Motion to Amend. 
A. APPELLANT IS JUSTIFIED IN FILING A MOTION TO AMEND 
BECAUSE APPELLEES USED QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE AS AN 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE. 
Appellant would be justified in filing a Motion to Amend because appellees 
asserted qualified privilege as an affiimative defense. Appellant did not predict the 
defense of qualified privilege when drafting the Complaint, but once appellees asserted 
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qualified privilege as an affirmative defense, it is up to appellant to show "abuse of the 
privilege by proving that the defendant acted with malice or that the publication of the 
defamatory material extended beyond those who had a legally justified reason for 
receiving i t" Brehany. 812 P.2d 49, 58. 
Appellant should be allowed to file a Motion to Amend because appellant can 
assert that appellees acted with malice when defaming appellant, which led to appellant's 
termination. In an amended complaint appellant would assert the qualified privilege that 
protects communications between Nielson, Smith, and Mason, was transcended by the 
appellees acting with malice. Appellant would assert that Mason and Smith published the 
defamatory statements about appellant because they were concerned with appellant's 
meticulous records and zealous desire to follow all state laws and regulations regarding 
the treatment and care of patients. Appellant was not going to attempt to "blow the 
whistle" on appellees for fear that appellees would terminate her if she did, however, 
appellees maliciously defamed appellant which led to her termination. 
In addition to Smith and Mason's actions toward appellant, Nielson also had 
malicious intentions for terminating appellant. Appellant argues that Nielson wanted her 
terminated because she was a threat to his job. Appellant asserts that shortly before her 
termination took place, she made a suggestion to Nielson about creating a wound-care 
unit in the place of a conference room. When Nielson heard this suggestion, appellant 
states that Nielson became irate and told appellant "he would handle it." (Objection to 
Dismiss). 
These incidents in combination with several others form the argument that 
appellees were malicious in making the defamatory statements which led to appellant's 
termination. These malicious actions are even more pronounced, if appellant in her 
amended complaint shows her exemplary work history and glowing recommendations. 
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Therefore, appellant requests that this Court remand this case back to the District 
Court, to allow appellant to file a Motion to Amend. Appellant did not know that a 
qualified privilege defense would be asserted and requests an opportunity to amend the 
compliant with die facts that support the argument that appellees were malicious in their 
defamatory statements which transcends the protection of qualified privilege. 
B. APPEIXANTISJUSTfl^DINFHLJNGAMOTfONTOAMEND 
BECAUSE APPELLANT WAS MISTAKEN AS TO HER CLAIM FOR 
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT. 
Appellant requests this Court to remand this case back to the District Court, so 
appellant can make a Motion to Amend, to amend her third cause of action. Appellant 
explained above in Argument 1(C) that she was mistaken in claiming the grievance 
procedure in the Employee Handbook created a contract between appellant and UBMC. 
In learning that the UBMC Employee Handbook discounts all arguments of contractual 
employment, and instead supports appellees' employment-at-will stance, appellant would 
have made a Motion to Amend the complaint to claim wrongful discharge. 
Under the claim for wrongful discharge appellant would pursue that appellees 
termination of appellant was a "violation of a clear and substantial public policy." 
Hansen v. America Online, Inc.T 96 P3d 950, 952 (Utah 2004). "An employee's 
discharge for a reason that contravenes a clear and substantial public policy gives rise to a 
cause of action in tort" Id* An employer should not "exploit the employment 
relationship by demanding that an employee choose between continued employment and 
violating a law or failing to perform a public obligation of clear and substantial import," 
Id, 
In the case at bar, appellant felt that her termination and the defamatory comments 
made by Mason, Smith, and Nielson, ensued from appellees concern that appellant 
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followed the rules and regulations of her profession too carefully. As stated in the 
argument above, appellant suspects that appellees pursued her termination because they 
were afraid that appellant would "blow the whistle." 
By being allowed to file a Motion to Amend, appellant would be able to assert the 
wrongful discharge claim and list the supporting facts that show appellant was discharged 
to contravene professional and ethical standards. 
Appellant requests that this Court remand this case, to allow appellant the 
opportunity to file a Motion to Amend, so appellant can claim wrongful discharge. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant maintains that her case was dismissed in error and that her claims of 
defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress were plead with enough 
particularity to give appellees notice of the nature and basis of the claims. As well, 
appellant argues that the District Court erred by not giving appellant time to file a Motion 
to Amend before dismissing this case. 
In conclusion, appellant respectfully requests that the District Court's ruling 
dismissing her case is reversed, and under the direction of this Court find that the original 
Complaint was plead sufficiently on the claims of defamation and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, or to allow appellant time to file a Motion to Amend the Complaint. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ^ d a y of November, 2004. 
KESSLER LAW OFFICE 
Kessler, Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of November, 2004,1 hand-delivered two 
copies of the foregoing Appellant Brief to the following: 
Carolyn Cox, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellees 
Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP 
299 South Main Street 
Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2263 
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ADDENDUM 
CONTENTS OF ADDENDUM 
1. Plaintiffs Complaint 
2. Defendants' Answer 
3. Defendant's Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss with 
attached Affidavits 
4. Plaintiff's Objection to motion to Dismiss with attached Affidavits 
5. Defendant's Reply Brief to Motion to Dismiss 
6. Eighth District Court's Order Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint. 
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Jay L.Kessler (8550) 
KESSLER LAW OFFICE 
Attorney for Melany Zoumadakis 
9117 West 2700 South, #A 
Magna, Utah 84044 
Telephone: (801) 252-1400 
Facsimile: (801) 252-1401 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
DEC 0 5 2003 
McKEE, CLERK 
DEPUTY 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELANY ZOUMADAKIS, 
Plaintiff. 
v. 
UNTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, INC., and 
individuals DR. MARK MASON, LLOYD 
NIELSON, CAROLYN SMITH, and JOHN 
DOES 1-10. 
Defendants. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
judge jR. ftnderoon 
CaseNo. 0 3 0 8 0 0 0 2 5 
COME NOW the Plaintiff, and for causes of action against the Defendants, 
allege as follows: 
JURISDICTION, VENUE, AMO THE PARTIES 
1. At the time of the mciefent giving rise to this cause of acfcon, trie Pfarnfrr? antf 
Defendants resio'edVn Oudhesne County, State of 'OteirT 
2. The incident giving rise to this cause of action occurred in Duchesne County, 
State of Utah. 
3. Jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§78=3-4(1). 
4. Venue is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-13-7. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
5. On or about Junet 1990, the Pfeintiff began her employment as a registered 
nurse with Defendant Uintah Basin Medrcaf Center witfi Home Beaffhcare (hereinafter 
UBMG). 
6. As far as the Plaintiff ever knew, she never received a negative report at her 
employment with UMBC Home Healthcare, 
7. On or about September 19, 2003, the Plawfiff was called into Defendant 
Lloyd Nielsen's, (hereinafter Mielson) office and told that there have been numerous 
complaints by Defendant Dr. Mason, (hereinafter Mason) against the Plaintiff, 
8. The specific complaints by Mason included that the Plaintiff was teffing 
patients that Mason was ordering wrong things, that Mason was giving improper care., 
and that the Plaintiff smeiied of alcohol as complained of by an unsolicited patient 
9. According to information and belief, Defendant Smith (hereinafter Smrth), also 
misrepresented to Mason that the Plaintiff was questioning his care. 
10. Without any research Into the allegations whatsoever, Ntefson wrote a 
disciplinary action subjecting the Pfainffff to aicohol m$ drug screens, a 
communications c\a$s, &eni&\ of the Plaintiff to speak with Mason's patients, denial of 
the PlaVnWf to speak wrui any patient or doctor about varfous treatment 
11. The abow-listerf TBsthcAicms would have been Impossible *o foffow under ih& 
Plaintiffs general dyftes a& a registered nurse< 
12. The disciplinary actton came as a result of libel, slanderous, paiesgfy fefee, 
and fraudulent ailsreprsseri^atfons by Defendants' Nielson, Mason, Smith, and/or other 
John Does. 
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13. The Defendants did nothing to confirm or corroborate the allegations against 
the Plaintiff. 
14. When the Plarntiff would not sign the disciplinary action form, and requested 
to take it home, review it, and make proper suggestions with her attorney, Nielson fired 
her, and the Plaintiff tost long term $?cr& teavef medica/ benefits, fife insurance, 
retirement benefits, wages, a?K% her job. 
15. All of the complaints against the Plaintiff were patently false, defamed her 
character, and have jeopardized her career 
16. Before being fired, the Plaintiff tried to talk to Mason, but was told by Niefson 
that if she talked to anyone about the disciplinary action she would be terminated. 
17. The Plaintiff wrote a letter to Mason, gave it to Niefson to give to Mason, and 
Nielson refused to give rt to Mason and would not return the letter to the Plaintiff, 
18. Nielsen's disciplinary report incorrectly states that the Plaintiff has been 
warned on many occasions regarding her behavior, when in reality, the Plaintiff has had 
an exemplary work history. 
19. The Piafnfrft "has tiietf to communicate wfth a\i of fne peopfe Involved in this 
matter hut has keen re&uffetf at every turn. 
20. In order to preserve their rights the Plaintiffs have hired present counsel &n6 
filed this lawsuit. 
3 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
LIBEL AND SLANDER (against all Defendants) 
21. The Plaintiff Incorporates herein by this reference paragraphs 1 through 20 of 
this Complaint 
22. The Defendants had an affirmative duty to speak and/or write the truth about 
the actions and professionalism of the Plaintiff ^i all tirnea relative to tier work, 
23. The Defendants breached tfiis tiuiy by spreading falsehoods by either the 
spoken wsrd of through writings sfartfr*g that the Plaintiff smi led of a\mho\ wfete on the 
job, that the Plaintrff questioned Mason's care for patients, and that the Plaintiff had 
r?ur?fer&tt& Kegstitm f&pzrts o?x b&r eTOj&bymant ?scsr&, 
24. Tb&t ifte Qefervia&ds' snafetous &ea&h o* tfeek cfetfy to speak and ~*%dte fee 
truth about the Plaintiff rises to the level of libel and slander. 
25. That due to the Defendants5 libef and slander against the Plaintiff, the 
Plaintiff has lost her job with Uintah Basin Media! Center, is suffering severe emotional 
and psychological depression arid stress, cannot find new employment, and is in 
danger of losing her home. 
26. That as a result of the Defendants5 libel and slander against the Plaintiff, the 
Plaintiff has suffered fosses of and is entitled to: at feast $200,000.00 in present and 
future lost wages; pain and" suffering; punitive damages pursuant to §78-18-1 of the 
Utah Code Annotated, because of the Defendant's w$fuf, maficfous, and/or inferrttonafJy 
fraudulent conduct In this matter; plus court costs, attorney's fees, interest and 
expenses. 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF B/tOTfOMAL DISTRESS(Afi Defendants) 
£7. The Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference paragraphs 1 through 28 
of this Complaint 
28- The Defendants kne*# and wiiffuliy subjected the Plaintiff to emotional 
distress by Jyio/3 about hBT work activities., pjofessionafom, and/or employment record. 
29. The Defendants subjected the Plaintiff to the aforesaid emotional distress 
specifically for the purpose of terminating her employment. 
30. The Plaintiff has been receiving counseling and \s on medication for the 
emotional distress the Defendants subjected her to. 
31. Due to the Defendant's Intentional InfUetiorr of Emotional Distress upon the 
Plaintiff, the Plaintiff is entitled to recover her compensatory damages which loci Licfe * 
loss of wages, all medical, prescription, and psychiatric foffts retetedto the ernotionaf 
distress, and an amount in punrtrve damages and pain and suffering to be determined 
at trial in this matter, plus interest, costs, expenses and attorney's fees, 
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH EMPLOYMENT (AH Defendants*} 
{32. The Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference paragraphs 1 through 31 
of this Complaint 
33. Each of the Defendants in this matter contributed to the false allegations 
against the Pfarntrff which fed to frer being termrnated from her emptoytnent, and 
makmg it rmpossifcte for rter to obtain comparable employment 
5 
34. According to information and belief, Defendant Smith, misrepresented and 
slandered the Plaintiffs conversation about Reason to Defendant Mason. 
35. According to information and belief, Defendant Mason slandered the plaintiff 
by stating to Deferidant Nfelson that the Piaiiitiff questioned his care, and smelted of 
afcohoi. 
36. Defendant Nielsen slandered and libeled the Plaintiff by askting unfme 
/•^p^rts .vi ^ tera&^cj'iVfbTrt£*le, t<?,W ttw De^rim&Kt&f xNa*ki&?c& S&rtsces tteak*&7& 
P\aintiff qu& and w&% n&t ftced, and misstated the Plaintiffs professionalism &nd work 
history thereby affecting her ahiltiv keept he? job o? ta obtain, future work.. 
37. Due to the Defendants' Tortious interference with employment, the Plaintiff 
has suffered iosses of and is entitled to: at least $200,000. DO in .present and future lost 
wages; pain and suffering; punitive damages pursuant to §78-18-1 of the Utah Code 
Annotated, because of the Defendants willful, malicious, &n&fQ? intentionally fraudulent 
conduct in this matter; plus court costs, attorney's fees, interest and expenses, 
PRATER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, ttse Plamfrffs pray for reffet against tfie Defendant as feftows: 
a) Rret Cause of Action; Slander and Libel, Vn ffie amount of aft least 
$20Q,0QQ.©& in pwsent and fa/tore IDS* wages; pain and suffering; punitwe tfamages 
pAus&arft fe? §TB= ?S-4i of I t e lAfeh Cc^fe Anra&fe&f* because *s# fee De&wda&tiS W8&&1, 
matiGAGM&i %nd/ofi \nter&Kx&frf'%rau&di3& €&ffufoc& in Svs, ma%&r; pte& c&tyA osste, 
attanie/s fee%, Merest 3&& e*go&ftS£s. 
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b) Second Cause of Action; intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: the 
Plaintiff is entitled to recover her campensatory damages wtiich Include: loss of wages, 
art' meaYcal, prescription, and psychiatric bitts refeted to the emotional distress, and an 
amount in 'punfttve damages &n& paVn and suffering to toe determined at trial in this 
matter, plus irftensst, casts, expemes and attorney's fees. 
c) Third Cat/se of/Ac&on, Torlvows Irteriferersee wtf? Empiaytrm^t, VT» tfee ^nnotirft 
c£ $200,000.00 in present »\cF fufessre }csg& w^ges; pass* a i d SL#esvrrgv p^rr&^eda^a&ja? 
pursuant to §7B=18-? of ihe Utafr Code Annotated, because of the Defendant's willful, 
malicious, a#d/or intentianalfy ftaudutent caociuct in this matter; plus, court, costs, 
attorney's fees., interest and e^oenses, 
DATED this / ^ day of November, 2003. 
KESSLER i A W OFFICE 
^ ^ - . — 
Jay y. Kessier, Counsel for Plaintiff 
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DATED this / V day of November, 2003. 
MelajryS^oumaci' 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Melany Zoumadakis, on this / ^ day of November, 2003, being first duly 
sworn and under oath, deposes and says that she is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled 
action; that she has read the foregoing Verified Complaint and understands the 
contents thereof, and the same is true and acceptable of her own knowledge. 
"2^ / ' t.i 
Notary Public 
SERVE: 
Uintah Basin Medical Center, Inc. 
c/o Bradley D. LeBaron, Registered agent 
250 West 300 North 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
9117 
Lloyd Nielson 
Uintah Basin Medical Center, Inc. 
250 West 300 North 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Dr. Mark Mason 
Uintah Basin Medical Center, Inc. 
250 West 300 North 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Carolyn Smith 
Uintah Basin Medical Center, Inc. 
250 West 300 North 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Blaine J. Benard, #5661 
Carolyn Cox, #4816 
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2263 
Telephone: (801)323-5800 
Facsimile: (801)521-9639 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF DUCHESNE 
MELANY ZOUMADAKIS, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, INC., 
and individuals DR. MARK MASON, 
LLOYD NIELSON, CAROLYN SMITH, and 
JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendant 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 030800083 
Judge John R. Anderson 
HEARING REQUESTED 
Defendants Uintah Basin Medical Center, Inc., Dr. Mark Mason, Lloyd Nielson and 
! 
Carolyn Smith, by their counsel and pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), move to dismiss the 
complaint of plaintiff Melany Zoumadakis in its entirety and with prejudice for failure to state a 
claim. This Motion is supported by a Memorandum in Support filed herewith. Defendants also 
request a hearing on this Motion pursuant to Rule 7 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this ^2? day of January, 2004. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
CAROLYN COX 
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2263 
Attorneys for Defendants 
#160812 vl 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this '---- ""day of January, 2004, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS was served by U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid, as follows: 
JAY L. KESSLER 
9117 West 2700 South #A 
Magna, Utah 84044 ^ ^ ^
 Q ^ ^ ^ ^ f . ^ ^ ^ / 
#160812 vl 
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HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Blaine J. Benard, #5661 
Carolyn Cox, #4816 
Brittany J. Nelson, #9937 
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2263 
Telephone: (801)323-5800 
Facsimile: (801)521-9639 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE HIGH 111 JUDICIAL D1SIR1C 1 COUR1 
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF DUCHESNE 
MELANY ZOUMADAKIS, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
UIN 1 ,\i l HAhiN MEDICAL CENTER, iiv 
and individuals DR. MARK MASON, 
LLOYD NIELSON, CAROLYN SMITH, am. 
JOHN DOES 1-10, 
DEFENDANT 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPOR1 OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
C;is, \\> n"()S(i(»()S N 
Judge John R. Anderson 
Defendants Uintah Basin Medical Center, Inc., Dr. Mark Mason, Lloyd Nielson and 
Carolyn Smith, by their counsel, respectfully submit this Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismi- f •" M - I i i i n i t i i , i d , i t '.!• ,1 I- '. 
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and should be dismissed, in its 
cull'. 
#160788 vl 
s i u i ' i y i - N i Mi. 11 i s 
1. Plaintiff Melany Zoumadakis (tcMs. Zoumadakis") was employed by Uintah 
Basin as a home health nurse in its home health department from appro\imaie]_ , * l 
ihrouiji ..:i.l-S:ntl.ml-..T',|fHr (YmiDlaint1fl|5, 14. 
2. Defendant Uintah Basin Medical Center ("Uintah Basin") is a small rural hospital 
located in Roo^ w.n 
3. Defendant Dr. Mark Mason is a doctor who provides services to Uintah Basin 
pursuant to a contract, undji .•.-.*>.i ,i-i.i.m.u^.-i >i u * ?. 
4. Defendant Lloyd Nielson is employed by Uintah Basm as the director of I hntah 
Basin's home health department, in wind u ole he supervised M, . zoumadakis «' «nin|>l mil Y\\ \ 
10. 
5. Defendant Carolyn Smith is employed In i mm. i*asin and serves i\>. i n .\ia 
medical assisliuit \ ' unplainl )\ 9 • . 
6. In this action, Ms. Zoumadakis claims that defendants defamed her. The specific 
allegations of defan latoi > • : c i m lit n licatioi is inch ide: 
a. a statement by Ms. Smith to Dr. Mason tllat Ms. Zoumadakis had 
questioned his care of u- = ».. 
b. complaints by Dr. Mason to Mr. Nielson that Ms. Zoumadakis was telling 
Dr. Mason's patients that he had ordered the wrong treatment and was givii lg impi opei cai e, ai i,c 1 
that a patient c .omplaine d t 3 Di Mason that Ms. Zoumadakis smelled of alcohol, Complaint j^ 8; 
#160 788 vl 
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c. a written disciplinary repnri bv Mr. Nielson that addressed the above complaints 
by Dr. Mason. Complaint f 18. 
7. A- . <•**• •' • -:i- ; ' ' - • ' v- •" 1 leges a claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. In support of that claim, Ms. Zoumadakis alleges that the 
( c i ' : n u . m l s : ,! , ih.ih .;. : • " ^ - n 1 • • n !. l.:iaph o 
above. Complaint 11 >• 
8. Ms./.uiiiuadaK.., i in;U . ause ui .wu-.-n ,i::,!., .ain ' :!iiu ferena-
with employment. In support of that claim, Ms. Zoumadakis alleges that defendants interfered 
with her employment by Uintah Basin by making the statements outlined in paragraph 6 above. 
C( )i i lpl. in it. f1'[33 36 
ARGUMENT 
I. MS. ZUUMADAKIS'I Ill S I C X I JSE OF \ CTION ALLEGING DEFAMATION 
MUST BE DISMISSED 
In her first cause ol .K ii^ii. ;MN. ,.i ..-.;i., .:K» . • -.ukmuii '• u-;.njnts 
of a claim for defamation include (1) that defendants published statements conceming plaintiff; 
(2) such statements were false, defamatory and not subject to any privilege, ^ ) sucti statements 
were published with the requisite degree of fault; and (4) their publication resulted in damage. 
West R Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1007 (Utah 1994), Ms. Zoumadakis' defamation 
(!••-'• ..-M-., \ m ..iiKViiKri!),!, " !. ' * • P! ..'• », • ith/, k-. -iau* particularity; (2) 
to the extent she identifies defamatory statements, such statements are subject to a qualified 
pi ivilege; and (3) as to defei idai it I Nielson, the defamatoi y staten lents atti ibi iteci to ! in :i i v /€ i e not 
published. 
#160788 vl 
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A. Ms. Z o u m a d a k i s ' Defamation Ciaiiu Is Not VU-tl With Par t icular i ty As 
Required R\ Rule 9 and I herefore II Mu^t Be Dismissed 
Thiokol Inr 70ft F.Supp 795, 799-800 (D.Utah 1988); Williams v. State Far™ 7>w. Co., 656 
1' Ai vi .(>, "o meet this requirement, a plaii itiff n lust identify the defai natoi y 
statement either by its "words or words to that effect;" general statements characterizing the 
defamatory words are inadequate. Id. Courts have also required that the complaint allege when, 
WVIIMV '•'• ' .!• • ' li i.\m-•- statement was made. Boisjoly, 706 F.Supp. at 800. 
This level of specificity is required so that the court can determine if the complained of statement 
Applying the above standards, Ms. Zoumadakis ' Complaint fails to state a claim for 
defamation .. . . / uiiKiuatj M m. --c^ s L',UK-J.<
 t- «M ^Uii. IIK -!i IK 
identify when and where such statements were allegedly made. Complaint, ^ | 8, 9 and 18. 
i • 
Thus, Ms. Zoumadakis ' first cause of action must be dismissed. 
B. Ms . Zoumadakis' Defamation Claim Must Be Dismissed Because To T h e 
Extent Defamatory Sta tements Are Adequately Alleged, They Are Subject 
To A Qualified Privilege 
The law has long recognized that a publication is conditionally privileged if it is made to 
protect a legitimate interest of the publisher. Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49, 59 (Utah 
uc.d-(i.\ i.J , :, A Viitrni, i,, ,.' - *.t. Icritim-\x *. :nr ion interest 
between the publisher and the recipient of the publication. Id, at 58; Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 
12 ; 5. 12 ; '8(1 Ital i 1/983) I lei e, at I: >c: st, Ms Z< n u i m 1; ik i s i i lk g< lit \i it Ms. Sr nth. Di: M; i: son's 
medical assistant, made a defamatory statement to Dr. Mason regarding Ms. Zoumadakis ' 
M160788 vi 
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interaction with Dr. Mason's patients; that Dr. Mason complained about Ms. Zoumadakis' 
interaction with his patients, and also reported a patient compiami rcyaruniLi M: / <>.IJM.:.MKJ^ U> 
Mr. Nielson, head of Uintah Basin's home health division and Ms. Zoumadakis' supervisor, and 
that Mr. Nielson prepared a written disciplinary action based on those statements. 
1\ * *, • « u , • n. Mason's statements to Mr. Nielson are 
subject to a qualified privilege and therefore cannot constitute defamation. Ms. Smith works for 
j M . M i ^ M l I. ! ! Hit '• ' i . t .v . i a m . \ ^ . .* . »iUt i v ^ t 
in the welfare of the patients seem by Dr. Mason. Statements by Ms. Smith to Dr. Mason 
regarding Ms. Zoumadakis5 interaction •*•....:.. . -: i : i - a-
that common interest. 
| Similarly, given that Dr. Mason is under contract with «;.*; pro\ uies services to - unah 
Basil i I ic has a cc teiest with "Uintah Basin. This interest is furthered by the fact that 
Uintah Basin's home health division provides care to Dr. Mason's patients. Again, statements 
j i • • , • j [» • _ _ thh division and directly 
supervises Ms. Zoumadakis, regarding Ms. Zoumadakis' performance of her home health duties 
.K . and t»w '••! -• *.x .. < 
Because the alleged defamatory statements fall within the qualified privilege, dismissal of 
Ms. Zoumadakis uuamai.i/.. tu; . . . . .n-iiiiiiii. 
C. Ms. Zoumadakis' Defamation Claim Must Be Dismissed" As Against 
Defendant Lloyd Nielson Because Ms. Zoumadakis Fails to Allege 
Publication 
Ms. Zoumadakis' defamation claim as against Nielson rests on a disciplinary report 
prepared by Mr, Nielson and presented to Ms. Zoumadakis that contained Dr. Mason's 
#160788 vl 
5 
complaints and concerns about Ms. Zoumadakis. To make out a claim for defamation, Ms. 
Zoumadakis must demonstrate .:;c ^iicgcu^. UL-iauwumy sl.ilnm ml 11 i 1IM ulr i ipliniirs 
report) was published to third parties. DeBry v. Godbe, 992 P.2d 979, 985 (( Hah 1999) ("the 
i 
requirement of publication means that the defamatory statement must be co;.un .: i .n .* d 
J>CJ -«»?. ? reads and understands the statement"). However, Ms. 
Zoumadakis alleges only that Mr. Nielson showed her the disciplinary report; she does not allege 
lli.il f.li Mi. I'.iin iniliirJH .1 III. ihwipliihir, ira|n111 (if JIT1,, flnnl |Mitv Because she has failed to 
establish publication by Mr. Nielson, a necessary element of a defamation claim, her first cause 
I 
of action must be dismissed a,> a i;.n-r ,i- • ,. -.« U\ Hi, , iciil ll,e 
claim relies on Mr. Nielson \s report. 
II. MS. ZOUMADAKIS* SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL 
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS MUST BE DISMISSED AS A 
MATTER OF LAW 
Ms. Zoumadakis" second cause of action purports to SUM . a * ... i :-
•f • motional distress against all defendants. This claim must be dismissed because Ms. 
Zoumadakis fails to state a claim under Utah law. 
111 " I 111 .11' 1 r 11111 (-i 11 11 i (11»1111 111 (1 i ction of emotional distress under Utah law, a plaintiff 
must show: 
(a) that the defendant engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff considered 
outrageous and intolerable in that it offends the generally accepted standards 
of decency and morality (b) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress 
or where any reasonable person would have known that such would result, 
and (c)that severe emotional distress resulted as a direct result of the 
defendant's conduct. 
#160788 vl 
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Ankers v. Rodman, 995 F.Supp. 1329, 1335 (D. Utah 1997) quoting Russell v. Thomson 
i 
Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 905 (I Itah 1992),,, Disn iissal < if i h iii i l fi )i intc :ntic >n; \\ ii rlln t ion 
of emotional distress on a Rule 12 motion is appropriate if all the elements of the tort are not 
i 
alleged or if the alleged conduct on which the claim is based does not rise to UK; ie\ ,i . : 
outragrousnrss ivun- j under Utah law. Boisjoly, 706 F.Supp. 795, 801-02 (D. Utah 1988). 
| Here, dismissal of Ms. Zoumadakis' intentional infliction claim is appropriate because as 
does not i ise to the level of 
outrageousness required under Utah law. Whether the alleged conduct at issue may reasonably 
be regarded-:. ^ . •. • ^^-n.Mi>a; v - > • «•• .. . t . 
Ankers, 995 F.Supp. at MIS I he burden of proving outrageous conduct is a heavy one, and 
liability may be imposed uui, AIICIC UIL ^ ;hui^; ^ . .A-L.'-I./, .*M I- a 
civilized community." Retherford v. AT & T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 977-78, n.19 (Utah 
1992). Conduct which simply constitutes an insult or indignity is not actionable. 
i > uiik; f-K *f • defendants Dr. Mason and Ms. Smith made untrue 
allegations to Ms. Zoumadakis' supervisor regarding her work performance in providing services 
lo thni patirnh, SHI li illnnliims rvrn ill" In nr hmlh lisrlutln level of "atrocious and utterly 
intolerable" behavior as required to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
defendant as an engineer and was involved in the manufacturing of certain parts used in Space 
Shuttle Challenger. After tlle Challenger explodeu, PLUULH i, . i : . anuo i a huei.il 
commission investigating the incident. Plaintiff claimed that in connection with that 
investigation, his employer discredited him, threatened his job and removed him from the 
7 
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investigation of the accident. Again, the court found that under Utah law, such conduct, while 
not laudable or desirable behavior, was not "so outrageous in character, and so extrenle in 
degiv^ : . ! , • • . ' -} bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and 
utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Id at 802. See also Ankers, 995 F. Supp. at 1 .oOo / 
(pi..-;
 ;i|», • ».'!.*.• • ' .fi." : I, ril*.. ill Association game 
and the television audience as a matter of law was not sufficiently outrageously to support a 
J 
claim for intentional miuciiv?.. •: emo;:- • uisuess). 
Taking Ms. Zoumadakis' allegations as true, that employees and contractors of Uintah 
Basin complained to Ms. Zoumadakis' supervisor regarding na pci unman 
simph ; ntiite conduct that is so outrageous and extreme "as to go beyond all 
possible bounds of decency" and be considered "atrocious," Ms Zoumadakis' second cause of 
ill MS. ZOUMADAKIS THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR TORTIOUS 
INTERFERENCE WITH EMPLOYMENT MlJST KF DISMISSED 
In support of her third cause of action for tortious interference with employment, Ms. 
Zoumadakis alleges that the false allegations that are the subjeci <,>i nci aeiainauo; 
hci In iiiiiiutf !i HI ,^  s .in initial matter, while Ms. Zoumadakis entitles her claim one of tortious 
interference with "employment/' such a claim does not exist under Utah law. Ms. Zoumadakis' 
M . •
 !1Ji; .n:--rfiTiMuv witl; contract within the employment setting. 
To establish a claim for interference with conliacL a parl> must show (1) that the defendant 
intentionally interfeu M im •.-Mas.^ . 
purpose or for an improper means; (3) causing damage to plaintiff. St. Benedict 'v Development 
#160788 vl 
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Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 1 lM, 2C»o (I 'tali 1WI); /« >/<?// Furniture & Carpet Co. v. 
horn, 657 P.2d 293 (I Jtah 1982); see also Milatz v .l-ntu / .a , /.-., . i"v ; .. App. i I:AI> .v/v, 
51
 '< F ( ' • -iiious interference with employment relationship requires the 
existence of a valid enforceable contract); Tatum v. Philip Morris, Inc., 809 F.Supp. 1452, 1468 
( - ^ M , ' ,Ai .: l ' ! '" <'* i s ^ . (1994) 
(same). Taking Ms. Zoumadakis' allegations as true, Ms. Zoumadakis7 claim must be dismissed 
because 1) she cannot cuu :. : . «-. -u • !? l ' ' r r , , , v n '* 
alleged are actions by parties to the relationship, which as a matter of law, cannot constitute 
interference with contract. 
A. Ms, Zoumadakis Does Not Adequately Allege ihe First 1 lenient of her Claim 
for Interference With Contract «»r iMterferenci- With Kniploymciit 
Relationship 
Taking M-• V• •• -\hhikis' allegations as true, her claim must be dismissed because she 
cannot meet the requirements of the first element of a claim for interference with contract or 
i .; . • : *• • \i •'. i • , u1 ikr . -t meet the requirements of the 
first element because she does not allege that she was employed pursuant to a valid enforceable 
empL ma / ( 7 ^ < '*• tr-<>'* " y 
301 (to prove a claim for interference with contract, plaintiff must prove the existence of a 
contract between hi i i. .,; Helena.. irupeiM • •
 /: s 1 \I^ V i ** } ^ o 
establish a claim for interference with employment requires an enforceable employment 
contract); Tatum, 809 F. Supp, at 1468 (same). Even taking hu allegations as true, Ms. 
.'MH.H. !,,kts .(, - ' * ,i|:.j .iiforceable contract with which the defendants 
interfered. Therefore, her claim must fail. 
9 
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Ms. Zoumadakis also fails to meet the requirements of the first element because she does 
not allege that defendants intentionally unci tered w un MCI employment reunion .;; 
Basin. Rather, at most, she alleges that the defendants made false and defamatory allegations 
against her which led to her being terminated from her employment. However, Utah law 
r , ' ! , , , r ' -•-••- *' *s . . , . 1 . : - ,n . . . , i i . - ..* roniidoing had some impact on 
an economic relationship of which the defendant should have been aware. Instead, to state a 
Cl'dl • • i | U l - . U . . ' j . M - •: U , t ' ' I ' ^ ' - P d i\\\ ' ' '< ' • • " ' • ' • ' , » ' » h 
the contract or business relation or that the defendant knew interference would he the 
substantially certain and necessary consequence 01 uie ancyeu ^ songiu .« ., , •%- rr 
Commercial Finance Corp., 858 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah App. Iv^J j . 
Here, Ms. Zoumadakis does not plead either that defendants intended to interfere with her 
einplo), nient i elatioi iship oi facts demonstrating that defendants knew interference would be the 
substantially certain and necessary consequence of their allegedly wrongful actions. Rather, Ms. 
Zoiii nadakis pleads oi lih 1:1 itat 1 lei termii latioi i < ( "ra s in fa ;:t tl is i ssi ilt • : i theii acts ai id hei claii i i for 
intentional interference must be dismissed. 
B. ' Ms . Z o u m a d a k i s ' Th i rd Cause of Action Must Be Dismissed ..lie c ause ' I lie 
Only In te r fe rence Alleged Is By Parties to The Contract 
As noted above, Ms. Zoumadakis ' claim of interference with contract fails because she 
c *n» -. '' *>>!. ,ihi; .- . -w •'• i "intah Basin, nor can she show defendants had 
the requisite intent. However, even il Ms. Zoumadakis could show a valid enforceable contract, 
1 u v i • . - • - ,xt.u n {- "i 
Leigh Furniture, "it is well settled that one party to a contract cannot be liable for the tort of 
#160788 vl 
10 
interference with contract for inducing a breach by himself or the other contracting party." 657 
P.2d at 301. Ms. Zoumadakis has alleged onL Uiat t miai, 1U;.... .mu IL> einpio>ees aim agents, 
interfered with her employment relationship with Uintah Basin. Such allegations are 
insufficient to establish her claim and it must be dismissed. 
CONCI 
For the reasons stated above, Ms. Zoumadakis' complaint should be dismissed in its 
DATED this Z 3 day of January, 2004. 
£ME.ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
BLAINEJTBENARD 
CAROLYN COX 
BRITTANY J. NELSON 
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2263 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Because a corporation can only act through its employees and agents, their acts must be 
considered the acts of the entity. 
#160788 vl 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this day of January, 2004, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS was served by 
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, as follows: 
JAYL.KESSLER 
9117 West 2700 South #A 
Magna, UT 84044 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
DATED this day of January, 2004. 
#160788 vl 
Jay L. Kessler (8550) 
KESSLER LAW OFFICE 
Attorney for Meiany Zoumadakis 
9117 West 2700 South, #A 
Magna, Utah 84044 
Telephone: (801) 252-1400 
Facsimile: (801) 252-1401 
FEB f 8; 2004 
EE
- CLERK 
DEPUTY 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELANY ZOUMADAKIS, 
Plaintiff. 
v. 
UNTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, INC., and 
individuals DR. MARK MASON, LLOYD 
NIELSON, CAROLYN SMITH, and JOHN 
DOES 1-10. 
Defendants. 
OBJECTION TO MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Judge JR Anderson 
Case No. 030800083 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through counsel undersigned, and objects to 
the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, as follows: 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Utah Supreme Court has heid, "When reviewing the propriety of granting a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, we 
accept as true all material allegations contained in the complaint and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 
194,196 (Utah 1991). 
ARGUMENT 
1. MS. ZOUMADAKIS' HAS A VIABLE CAUSE OF ACTION IN DEFAMATION 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS 
The elements for a claim of defamation are as outlined in Defendants 
Memorandum. They are: 
A) That Defendants published statements concerning Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff states in her Complaint that Defendants Carolyn Smith and Dr. Mark 
Mason published falsehoods about the Plaintiffs work history. The Plaintiff specifically 
states: 
8. The specific complaints by Mason included that the Plaintiff was telling 
patients that Mason was ordering wrong things, that Mason was giving 
improper care, and that the Plaintiff smelled of alcohol as complained of 
by an unsolicited patient. 
9. According to information and belief, Defendant Smith (hereinafter 
Smith), also misrepresented to Mason that the Plaintiff was questioning 
his care. (See Complaint-paras 8 & 9). 
The Plaintiff also specifically states in her Complaint that Defendant Nielson 
published: 
18. Nielsen's disciplinary report incorrectly states that the Plaintiff has 
been warned on many occasions regarding her behavior, when in reality, 
the Plaintiff has had an exemplary work history. (See Complaint-para 18). 
Not only were specific statements published by the Defendants as properly pled, 
but the statements were pled with particularity. Specifically the untruths as to how the 
Plaintiff took care of her patients; how she took care of herself (i.e. the alcohol breath 
statement); that the Plaintiff questioned the doctor's care; and that untruths were written 
in her employment history. 
The above-listed statements are specific enough in order for the Defendants to 
formulate a defense. 
2 
Also, the Plaintiff states in her Complaint that she was told about the aforesaid 
untruths in the office of Defendant Nielson on September 19, 2003. The employment 
history untruths would need to be turned over in discovery to ascertain exactly when 
and where those untruths took place. 
B) Such statements were false, defamatory and any privilege is rebuffed by 
Defendants' malice. 
The Plaintiff clearly rebuffs the statements published by the Defendants. The 
Complaint outlines that the Defendants have ruined the Plaintiffs life through the 
defamatory statements. 
Further, it is curious that the Defendants do not deny that their statements were 
untrue. Instead the Defendants invoke a qualified privilege that the statements that 
were made are the subject of a common interest between Dr. Mason, Ms. Smith, and 
Mr. Nielson to protect the welfare of the patients. Unfortunately, the statements were 
untrue, and used to terminate Ms. Zoumadakis* employment for many malicious 
reasons, such as: 
a. Defendant Mason and Smith published untruths about the Plaintiff 
because they were concerned about the Plaintiffs meticulous records and zealous 
desire to follow all state laws and regulations regarding treatment and care for patients. 
Although the Plaintiff did not attempt to "blow a whistle" on the behaviors of Smith and 
Mason, it became clear that they would try and do anything to remove the Plaintiff from 
her job; even publish untruths. (See Exhibit A-Affidavit of Melany Zoumadakis). 
b. It is the Plaintiffs belief that Defendant Nielson wanted the Plaintiff 
removed from her job because she was a threat to his job. Shortly before Mr. Nielson 
3 
threatened to terminate the Plaintiff, Ms. Zoumadakis made the suggestion that a 
wound-care unit could be put into one of the conference rooms, and that if it would help 
she could talk to the administrators about it. My Nielson became irate and told the 
Plaintiff that "He would handle i f . (See Exhibit A-Affidavit of Melany Zoumadakis). 
Also, when the staff at the Medical Center found out what had taken place 
with the PlaintifTs termination, they made a card in support of her. According to workers 
who desire to remain anonymous, Mr. Nielson grabbed the card away, destroyed it, and 
yelled at the employees who drafted and signed i t (See Exhibit A-Affidavit of Melany 
Zoumadakis). 
One of the employees specifically told Ms. Zoumadakis that he told Mr. 
Nielson that "He would not participate in blackballing her [the Plaintiff]." Insinuating that 
this is exactly what Mr. Nielson was trying to do. (See Exhibit A-Affidavit of Melany 
Zoumadakis). 
Ms. Zoumadakis' exemplary record and many supporters (as evidenced by many 
community petitions to reinstate her) show that Mr. Nielson fired Ms. Zoumadakis and 
published a fraudulent and/or libelous employment history of her to "blackball her" for 
his own employment comfort. 
C) As outlined above the Plaintiff does indeed allege that Mr. Nielson 
published his untruths for the purpose of terminating the Plaintiff. 
Not only did Defendant Nielson publish his untruths about the Plaintiff in her 
employment file, but he wrongfully, and with the malicious intent to defame, tell Utah 
Workforce Services that the Plaintiff quit from her job rather than her being wrongfully 
terminated. (See Exhibit A-Affidavit of Melany Zoumadakis). 
4 
This information will need to be obtained through discovery. As such a Motion to 
Dismiss is premature at this stage. 
2. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IS A VIABLE CAUSE OF 
ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS. 
The Plaintiff agrees that IIED may be imposed if the conduct of the tortfeasor is 
"atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Retherford v. AT&T 
Communications. 844 P.2d 949. 977-78 (Utah 1992). 
Clearly the conduct of the Defendants rises to the level of IIED. The Defendants 
rely upon Boisjoly v. Morton ThiokolT lnc.T 706 F.Supp. 795 (D. Utah 1988) to support 
their position that Ms. Zoumadakis was not sufficiently inflicted with enough intention 
emotional distress to warrant a cause of action. Boisjoly, at 801-02. 
Boisjoly is distinguished from the present case because the untruths did not cost 
the Boisjoly Plaintiff his job. He was just moved to a different position. In Ms. 
Zoumadakis' case, she was terminated because of published untruths. 
It is the extra malicious step of terminating the job Ms. Zoumadakis loved and 
performed so well for more than 13 years which makes the Defendants' actions 
"atrocious and utterly intolerable". 
3. MS, ZOUMADAKIS WAS A THIRTEEN YEAR AT-WILL EMPLOYEE EXCEPT FOR 
THE EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK AGREEMENT WHICH WAS BREACHED DUE TO 
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT. 
Although Ms. Zoumadakis cannot show a specific contract for work, she was a 
long-term employee who considered her job secure. Her employee handbook provided 
for a grievance procedure which was breached by Defendant Nielson. (See Exhibit 
5 
B-Grievance Procedure). 
The procedure allowed for a meeting with two administrators regarding the 
specific grievance. After the termination, and within the five day window to file, Ms. 
Zoumadakis tendered the grievance to Defendant Medical Center, which was 
summarily ignored. As such it was a breach of an employee/employer contract due to 
the tortious interference of the Defendants. (See Exhibit C-Formal Notice of Grievance 
Letter). 
Further discovery will evidence the breach of employment contract and the 
tortious interference thereof. 
CONCLUSION 
A period of time to conduct discovery is necessary to determine if the Complaint 
should be amended, and to what degree. The Utah Supreme Court held, "Utah, 
however has adopted liberalized pleading rules. These rules allow parties to present 
any legitimate claims they have relating to their dispute, subject to the requirement that 
their adversary have fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a 
general indication of the type of litigation involved." 
The Plaintiff respectfully requests that a period of discovery be allowed to 
determine if the pending Motion to Dismiss has merit, and that the pleadings be allowed 
to be amended if necessary. 
DATED this 1*7 day of February, 2004. 
KESSLER LAW OFFICE 
y ^ — : 
J/ay l/Kessler, attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this P day of February, 2004,1 sent via hand-delivery or First 
Class United States Mail a copy of the foregoing Objection to Motion to Dismiss to the 
following: 
Carolyn Cox, Esq. 
Holme Roberts & Owen LLP 
299 S. Main Street 
Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2263 
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Jay L. Kessler (8550) 
KESSLER LAW OFFICE 
Attorney for Melany Zoumadakis 
9117 West 2700 South, #A 
Magna, Utah 84044 
Telephone: (801) 252-1400 
Facsimile: (801) 252-1401 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELANY ZOUMADAKIS, 
Plaintiff. 
UNTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, INC., and 
individuals DR. MARK MASON, LLOYD 
NIELSON, CAROLYN SMITH, and JOHN 
DOES 1-10. 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
OBJECTION TO MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Judge JR Anderson 
Case No. 030800083 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
County of Salt Lake) 
I, Melany Zoumadakis, being first duly sworn upon her oath, deposes and attests as 
follows: 
1. That I am an adult and am competent and able to attest to the following 
matters from personal knowledge and experience. 
2. That I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action. 
3. That I was terminated from my job Uintah Basin Medical Center, Inc. due to 
the malicious defamation of the Defendants, specifically due to the following behaviors: 
a. Defendant Mason and Smith published untruths about me because 
they were concerned about my meticulous records and zealous desire to follow all state 
laws and regulations regarding treatment and care for patients. Although the I did not 
attempt to "blow a whistle" on the behaviors of Smith and Mason, it became clear that 
they would try and do anything to remove me from my job; even publish untruths. 
b. It is my belief that Defendant Nielson wanted me removed from my job 
because he believed that I was a threat to his job. Shortly before Mr. Nielson 
threatened to terminate me, I made the suggestion that a wound-care unit could be put 
into one of the conference rooms, and that if it would help I would talk to the 
administrators about it. My Nielson became irate and told me that "He would handle it". 
Also, when the staff at the Medical Center found out what had taken place 
with my termination, they made a card in support of me. According to workers who 
desire to remain anonymous, Mr. Nielson grabbed the card away, destroyed it, and 
yelled at the employee who drafted it. 
One of the other employees specifically told me that he told Mr. Nielson 
that "He would not participate in blackballing me." Insinuating that this is exactly what 
Mr. Nielson was trying to do. 
4. Also, when I applied for unemployment, Mr. Nielson gave an untrue statement 
of my work history to the Dept. of Workforce Services to try and deny me benefits. 
5. That If called upon to testify in this matter I would affirm the above written 
statements. 
Further affiant saith not. 
2 
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FROM I flMLS 
NATIONAL HOME ADUANTAGE •+ 5691420 
RW HD. : 5691420 
NO. 025 
Feb. 16 2B04 08:03PM 
DATED thfc J j L day of February, 2004. 
c"j? 
©TATE OF UTAH ) 
86 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Melany Zoumadakis, on tht» U day of February, 2004, being first duly 
sworn and under oath, depose* and says that she i* tha Ptaintfff in the above-entitled 
action; that she has read the foregoing document and understands the oontente 
911 
JAY i •"^JSLEP 
South 
64044 
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I hereby certHy that on this M.. day of February, 2004,1 sent via First Class 
United States Mai a copy of the foregoing Affidavit in Support of Objection to Motion to 
Dismiss to the foHwring: 
Carolyn Cox, Esq. 
Holme Roberts & Owen LLP 
299 S. Main Street 
Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.2263 
3 
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GRIEVANCE PR0CEDUSE/4LTERN A W E DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 
Uintah Basin Medical Center is firmly committed that undisclosed 
problems will remain unresolved, and eventually lead to a decay of 
work relationships, dissatisfaction m working coBC&tions, and a 
decline in productivity. Therefore, Uintah Basin Medical Center 
has established a grievance procedure to solve problems as quickly 
and fairly as possible. The grievance procedure should not be 
interpreted as anything more than a method of solving problems 
before they reach damaging proportions. 
Eligibility: 
Employees eligible to grieve under the grievance procedure are 
Full-Time Regular employees, Part-Time Regular employees and 
PRN employees. Volunteers and employees who voluntarily 
terminate employment are ineligible to grieve under the grievance 
procedure. 
Gubtelixies: 
Employees who seekiesolutLon of employment situations by using 
the grievance procedure ate assured that they will not be subject to 
discrimination, retaliation, or be penalized in any way for their use 
of the following procedures. 
An employee having a problem, complaint, or dispute 
should make every effort to resolve the matter through 
discussion with the immediate supervisor. An employee 
should use diligence in trying to work any problems out 
with their supervisor. Only after measurable effect feas 
been made should an employee move on to the other steps 
If the employee's concern is not resolved to ths employee* s 
satisfaction through step 3U the employee may file a written 
appeal tO thC DirOCtW of Human Resources within five (5) 
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EXHIBIT C 
KESSLER LAW OFFICE 
JAY L. KESSLER, ATTORNEY 
3338 Sowth 900 Beat 
Suite #120 
eaK Lake CHy, Utah 84t«* 
T«to|»h©ne:<W1)4«7-37*0 
Fscsim&s: (801) 497-3704 
September 24,2003 
Uifflah Basin Medical Center, Inc. 
Director of Human Resource* 
250 West 300 Norm 75-2 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Re: Zoumadakis v. Uintah Basin Medical Canter. Imx, Uoyd Neiten. 
Dr. Mason, et al. 
Grievance totter 
Deer Director of Human Resource*,! 
I have bean retained by Melany ZoumadaKle to rectify the Inappropriate 
termination of her employment. Let this letter to my format notice of our 
grtevance regarding the inappropriateneas and manner In which aha was 
terminated. 
Me. Zoumadafcls vshementty refute* the charges against her. She 
feels as though virtually no effort was made to corroborate these charges, The 
letter styled 'Ggrrtfcflye, DififiWinav AQtrPP' which «ne was auppoaed to sign, 
does not evidence anything she has done wrong except for what Or, Mason 
afleges, which we dispute. 
This letter is the only notice you wffi receive regarding our depute with the 
manner Ms. Zoumedakis was terminated. We wHf settfe for nothing short of the 
following: 
1. Anirr«T!edlsterek)sl8tem®rittohefiot>; 
2. Reimbursement for all back wage© she hae tost; 
3. A written apology on behalf of Ihe Medical Center; and, 
4. Ro^ibunt^^dntofaflm^l^lbilteahehaftirM^rreddsjiitoth* 
emotional distress she has been subjected to. 
It fs my belief that this matter can be settled amicably, but it I do not hear from 
yourself or your attorney by September 30,2003, by 4.30 P.M., we will personally 
serve you with a Complaint filed In the Eighth Judicial District Court. Following 
1 
the fHing in the court, and service of the same to you, you wi« have twenty days 
to file an answer. 
The District Court Complaint wilt be Mparate from a discrimination claim 
filed concurrently wfth the local office of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission. 
If you have any questions please do not hesitate to call. 
Sincerely, 
L Kessler 
cc: M. Zoumadakis 
2 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Blaine J. Benard, #5661 
Carolyn Cox, #4816 
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2263 
Telephone: (801) 323-5800 
Facsimile: (801) 521-9639 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF DUCHESNE 
MELANY ZOUMADAKIS, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, INC., 
and individuals DR. MARK MASON, 
LLOYD NIELSON, CAROLYN SMITH, and 
JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendant 
REPLY MEMORANDUM 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 030800083 
Judge John R. Anderson 
HEARING REQUESTED 
Defendants Uintah Basin Medical Center, Inc., Dr. Mark Mason, Lloyd Nielson and 
Carolyn Smith, by their counsel, respectfully submit this Reply Memorandum in Support of their 
Motion to Dismiss the complaint of plaintiff Melany Zoumadakis. For the reasons stated below 
and in defendants' initial Memorandum in Support dated January 23, 2004 ("Memo, in 
Support"), plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and should 
be dismissed, in its entirety, with prejudic!^. 
#162739 vl 
ARGUMENT 
I. ZOUMADAKIS' FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEFAMATION SHOULD BE 
DISMISSED 
A. Zoumadakis' Defamation Claim Is Not Pled With Adequate Particularity 
Defendants first seek dismissal of Zoumadakis' defamation claim on the grounds it is not 
pled with adequate particularity. In response, Zoumadakis argues that she adequately pled the 
content of the allegedly defamatory statements and therefore has met her particularity burden. 
However, even assuming Zoumandakis adequately pled the content of the alleged statements, to 
meet her burden of pleading with particularity, Zoumadakis must also allege when, where and to 
whom the alleged defamatory statement was made. Boisjoly v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 706 F.Supp 
795, 800 (D. Utah 1988).1 Zoumadakis has not pled this additional information with respect to 
the alleged defamatory statements and her first cause of action must therefore be dismissed. 
B. Zoumadakis' Defamation Claim Must Be Dismissed Because Even Assuming 
She Met Particularity Requirements, The Alleged Defamatory Statements 
Are Subject To A Qualified Privilege 
As set forth in defendants' initial Memo, in Support, even assuming Zoumadakis pled her 
defamation claim with adequate particularity, her claim must still be dismissed because the 
defamatory statements alleged are subject to a qualified privilege. In response, Zoumadakis does 
not dispute the common interest between the defendants giving rise to the privilege, but rather 
argues that the privilege does not apply for several reasons. First, Zoumadakis suggests that the 
1
 In her reply, Zoumadakis argues that she meets this requirement because her Complaint 
identifies when she learned of the alleged defamatory statement. However, Zoumadakis must 
identify when, where and to whom the alleged defamatory statements were made, not when she 
learned about the statements. 
2 
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qualified privilege does not apply because the alleged defamatory statements are untrue. 
However, application of the qualified privilege does not rest on the truth of the alleged 
defamatory statements. Rather, the privilege blocks liability even though the statements are in 
fact false. Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49, 58-59 (Utah 1991). 
Based on an affidavit submitted with her Objection to the Motion to Dismiss, 
Zoumadakis also asserts that the statements were made for malicious reasons, including that 
defendants Mason and Smith were concerned about Zoumadakis' meticulous records and her 
desire to follow all state laws and regulations regarding patient treatment and care; and that 
defendant Nielson wanted to terminate plaintiff because she was a threat to his job. As an initial 
matter, Zoumadakis' assertions in opposition to defendants' motion are not raised in the 
Complaint, but were made only in response to this motion. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion addresses 
the sufficiency of the allegations contained in the complaint. Zoumadakis cannot supply missing 
elements of her complaint by way of a self serving affidavit filed in response to a motion to 
dismiss. See e.g. Nester v. Bank One Corp., 244 F.Supp. 1344, 1346 (D. Ut. 2002) (It is 
inappropriate to consider an affidavit from plaintiff in connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss since the sufficiency of the complaint is the only issue before the court). 
Moreover, as Zoumadakis acknowledges, her new affidavit is not based on her own 
knowledge but rather on hearsay. Thus, her affidavit is defective and cannot provide a basis for 
denying defendants'motion. 
#162739 vl 
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As set forth in defendants' initial Memo, in Support, the alleged defamatory statements 
are privileged as a matter of law and Zoumadakis' defamation claim therefore must be 
dismissed. 
C. Zoumadakis' Defamation Claim Must Be Dismissed As Against Defendant 
Nielson for Lack of Publication 
As set forth in defendants' initial Memo, in Support, Zoumadakis' defamation claim must 
be dismissed as against defendant Nielson for the additional reason that his alleged defamatory 
statements were not published to a third party. In her objection, Zoumadakis does not dispute 
that Nielson's alleged defamatory statements were not published to a third party. However, 
Zoumadakis seeks to avoid dismissal of her claim through a new allegation that Nielson told 
Utah Workforce Services that Zoumadakis quit her job, rather than saying she was wrongfully 
terminated. Once again, Zoumadakis can not rectify deficiencies in her Complaint through 
statements and assertions not contained in the Complaint. 
In addition, and more importantly, Nielson's statement to workforce services that 
Zoumadakis quit her employment is simply not defamatory. To constitute defamation, a 
statement must impeach an individual's honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation, and thereby 
expose the individual to public hatred, contempt or ridicule. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 
P.2d. 999, 1008 (Utah 1994). Simply stating that a person quit their job, even if untrue, does not 
constitute defamation as a matter of law. Zoumadakis' defamation claim must therefore be 
dismissed. 
IL ZOUMADAKIS' SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL 
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
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Defendants seek dismissal of Zoumadakis' second cause of action alleging intentional 
infliction of emotional distress on the grounds that as a matter of law, the conduct on which her 
claim is based (Dr. Mason's and Smith's allegedly untrue statements regarding Zoumadakis' 
work performance, and Nielson's documentation of the same) does not rise to the level of 
outrageousness necessary to state a claim under Utah law. Boisjoly, 706 F. Supp. at 801-02 
(plaintiffs allegations that his employer discredited him, threatened his job and removed him 
from the investigation of NASA accident did not rise to outrageousness necessary to state a 
claim under Utah law). In response, Zoumadakis attempts to distinguish the Boisjoly case and 
argues that here defendants' conduct is more outrageous because she was ultimately terminated. 
However, Utah courts have consistently rejected claims for intentional infliction that arise out of 
the alleged wrongful termination of an employee. 
In Larson v. Sysco Corp., 161 P.2d 557 (Utah 1989), plaintiff claimed he had been 
wrongfully terminated, and in addition to a claim for breach of contract, sought recovery for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court affirmed the lower court's grant of 
summary judgment on plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, stating: 
that "[wjhile" termination can be an emotionally distressing event in one's life, mere termination 
alone does not constitute the intentional infliction of emotional distress." Id. at 561. 
Similarly, in Sperber v. Galigher Ash, 747 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of an 
alleged wrongful termination was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim under Utah law. 
As in Larson, the Court found that mere discharge from employment, even where plaintiff 
5 
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claimed the employer had given an incorrect reason for termination, did not state a claim for 
intentional infliction as a matter of law. The Court noted that while every employee who 
contests a termination decision suffers some emotional anguish as a result of the termination, 
such distress is simply insufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
absent facts that would independently support such a claim. Id. at 1028-1029. See also, 
Gudenkaufv. Stauffer Comm., Inc., 922 F.Supp. 461, 464 (D.Kan. 1996) (termination for 
allegedly discriminatory reasons is insufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress); Bunker v. City ofOlathe, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3583 (D.Kan. 2001) 
(demotion and other adverse employment actions for allegedly wrongful reasons is insufficient to 
state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
Here, Zoumadakis essentially alleges that defendants should not have terminated her 
employment and the reasons proffered were incorrect. Such allegations, even if true, do not state 
a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Her second cause of action should be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
IIL ZOUMADAKIS5 CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH 
CONTRACT MUST BE DISMISSED 
Defendants seek dismissal of Zoumadakis' third cause of action for interference with 
contract for two reasons: 1) she does not allege, nor can she, that she had a valid contractual 
relationship with which the defendants interfered, the first element of a claim for interference 
with contract; and 2) she alleges only interference by parties to the contracts or their employees 
and agents. With respect to the first basis for dismissal, Zoumadakis does not dispute that she 
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did not have an employment agreement and in fact acknowledges that she was an at will 
employee . Zoumadakis' Objection to Motion to Dismiss at 5. As an at will employee, 
Zoumadakis did not have a valid enforceable employment contract with which defendants could 
interfere. See Defendants' initial Memo, in Support at 8-9. In addition, as she does not dispute, 
Zoumadakis alleges only wrongful actions on the part of defendants, and does not allege that 
defendants undertook those acts in an intentional attempt to interfere with her contractual 
relationship. In the absence of such allegations, her claim fails. See Defendants' initial Memo, 
in Support at 10. 
More importantly, even if Zoumadakis had or could allege a valid enforceable contract 
with which defendants intentionally interfered, as set forth in defendants' initial Memo, in 
Support, she alleges only interference by Uintah Basin or its employees and agents acting on its 
behalf. One party to the contract cannot be liable for the tort of interference with contract. Leigh 
Furniture & Carpet Co. v. horn, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982). Zoumadakis fails to even 
address this argument, much less provide contrary authority. Her third cause of action for 
interference with contract must therefore be dismissed. 
2
 Zoumadakis does suggest that she was denied a grievance procedure to which she was 
entitled. While defendants dispute Zoumadakis' assertions, such assertions cannot defeat this 
motion to dismiss because they are not raised in the complaint. See above at 3. In addition, even 
if Zoumadakis' assertions had been set forth in her complaint and Zoumadakis could 
demonstrate that the grievance procedure was a valid contractual right, her claim would still fail 
because the alleged acts of interference were by a party to the contract, i.e., Uintah Basin or 
others acting on its behalf. See below at 7. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in defendants' initial Memo, in Support, Zoumadakis' 
Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice. 
DATED this d ^ day of February, 2004. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
CAROLYN COX 
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2263 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 2 ^ day of February, 2004, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS was served by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, as follows: 
Jay L. Kessler 
9117 West 2700 South #A ,, , . 
Magna, Utah 84044 f kA. j / ; I , Jf 
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DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
MAY 2 h 20M 
JOAH&1E MoKEE, CLERK 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 3Y ^ ^ f t — DEPUTY 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELANY ZOUMADAKIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER 
et al., -
Defenc ants. 
RULING 
Case No. 030800083 
Judge John R. Anderson 
The Court having received defendants' Motion to Dismiss, plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition, defendant's Reply, having received oral argument, having reviewed the pleadings 
and being otherwise fully informed, enters the following: 
I 
This case involves Ms. Zoumadakis, who was employed by Uintah Basin Medical Center 
("UBMC") as a home health care nurse and Dr. Mark Mason (employed by UBMC), Carolyn 
Smith (doctor Mason's medical assistant), and Mr. Lloyd Nielson (director of home health care). 
Summarily, the plaintiff claims defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
interference with contract in the employment setting. The dispute revolves around 1) statements 
made by Ms. Smith to Dr. Mason that Plaintiff had questioned Dr. Mason's care of his patients; 
2) complaints by Dr. Mason to Mr. Nielson that Plaintiff had been complaining of his care to the 
patients and a complaint by a patient that Plaintiff smelled of alcohol; and 3) Mr. Nielson's 
written disciplinary report addressing the above complaints. 
Plaintiffs claim for defamation was not pled with particularity as required. The general 
statements referred to in the Complaint do not inform defendants when, where and to whom the 
alleged defamatory statements were made. Even if the allegations are sufficient, they are subject 
to a qualified privilege, as Dr. Mason, Ms. Smith, and Mr. Nielson all share a common interest 
and the statements were made to protect a legitimate interest of the publisher. See Brehany v. 
Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49, 59 (Utah 1991). Finally, Plaintiff did not allege that Mr. Nielson 
published the disciplinary report to any third party who read and understood the statements. 
Plaintiff attempts to rebuff the privilege by claiming the statements were untrue. However, the 
privilege is not defeated even if the statements were false. Plaintiff submits an affidavit in which 
she raises new information not raised in her complaint, such as, defendants were acting out in 
alleged retribution, or that Mr. Nielson made statements to a third party. Because the 12(b) 
motion's focus is on the sufficiency of the complaint, it is inappropriate to consider this affidavit, 
despite the affidavit being defective as based on hearsay. 
Similarly, plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is insufficient, 
as the alleged conduct does not rise to the level required by Utah law, i.e., going "beyond all 
bounds of decency, and . . . . atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Boisjoly v. 
Morton Thiokol Inc., 706 F. Supp 795, 802 (D. Utah 1988). Defendant has provided ample case 
law that indicates mere termination is not sufficient to constitute outrageous conduct as required 
for a valid intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 
Finally, Plaintiffs claim for interference with employment contract is fatally flawed. 
Plaintiff has shown no valid enforceable employment with which to interfere. Plaintiff was an 
at-will employee. Even if plaintiff could show a valid enforceable contract, which as noted 
above she cannot, Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. horn, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) indicates 
one party to the contract cannot be liable for interference for inducing a breach by himself or by 
the other party. Here, all of Defendants are parties to the contract, either directly or as UBMC's 
employees or agents. As such, they cannot be liable for interference. In response, Plaintiff refers 
to the grievance procedure provided for in the employee handbook, and claims she was denied 
the process, therefore Defendants interfered with her employment. However, as stated above, she 
does not allege anybody other than parties to the contract interfered, and therefore, Defendants 
cannot be held liable under a claim for interference of contract. 
Based upon the above, it is hereby ORDERED that defendants' Motion to Dismiss is 
GRANTED. 
vi Dated this Pi day of May, 2004 
. Anderson, District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
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